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COOPER V. AARON AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Christopher W. Schmidt*
“[T]he Federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution.”
— Cooper v. Aaron (1958)1
“The logic of Cooper v. Aaron was, and is, at war with the basic principles
of democratic government, and at war with the very meaning of the rule of
law.”
— Attorney General Edwin Meese III (1986)2
I. INTRODUCTION
The greatest Supreme Court opinions are complex heroes. They have
those attributes that make people recognize them as great: the strategic
brilliance and bold assertion of the authority of judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison;3 the common-sense refutation of the fallacies that justified racial
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education;4 the recognition that something
as fundamental as a right to privacy must be a part of our constitutional
protections in Griswold v. Connecticut.5 But they also have flaws, blind
spots, and complications. Marbury was the product of a dizzying array of
craven politics, flagrant violations of judicial ethics, and tendentious legal
analysis.6 In Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren narrowed the Court’s holding
by unconvincingly differentiating segregated schools from other forms of
state-mandated segregation and then referencing questionable claims about
the psychological damage of black children to justify that holding.7 Justice
*

Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, and Co-Director, Institute on
the Supreme Court of the United States (ISCOTUS), Chicago-Kent College of Law; Faculty
Fellow, American Bar Foundation; Editor, Law & Social Inquiry.
1. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
2. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 987 (1987)
(address at Tulane University, October 21, 1986).
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS
TIMES 243–61 (2018); William W. Van Alsytne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–33 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1960).
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William O. Douglas’s opinion of the Court in Griswold, with its reliance on
“penumbras” and “emanations” of enumerated rights, has been reduced to a
laugh line for constitutional lawyers.8
So too Cooper v. Aaron.9 Its attributes of greatness are self-evident. In
language more resonant and forceful than Warren’s carefully measured
words in Brown, the Justices in Cooper denounced the white South’s
continuing commitment to segregation. To amplify the Court’s unanimity,
each of the nine justices attached his name to the ruling. Yet for a decision
that on the surface seems so right, Cooper has attracted an unusual
collection of critics, people from across the ideological spectrum who
believe that in the Court’s effort to undermine the legitimacy of the white
supremacist backlash against Brown, the Justices went too far and thereby
got something very wrong. The target of this critique is the Court’s claim
that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the Constitution”
and “the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”10 This claim of
judicial interpretive supremacy—the idea that the Court is the ultimate and
exclusive interpreter of the Constitution and that the American people must
defer to the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution as if it were the
Constitution itself11—has been condemned as mistaken, nonsensical, a
power grab by the Supreme Court, and an affront to the most fundamental
principle of a constitutional democracy.12
In this Essay, I offer a brief biography of this particular hero of
American constitutional history, with a focus on its complexities, on its
interwoven strands of moral stature and bluster. My portrait of Cooper
includes the history that led the Justices to craft an opinion that contained
8. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOLUME 1, at 43
(3rd ed. 2000) (describing Douglas’s reference to “penumbras, formed by emanations” as
“twilight zone talk”).
9. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
10. Id. at 18.
11. Other efforts to encapsulate the strong judicial supremacist position include KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 7 (2007) (“Judicial
supremacy asserts that the Constitution is what the judges say it is, not because the
Constitution has no objective meaning or that the courts could not be wrong but because there
is no alternative interpretive authority beyond the Court.”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7 (1999) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department—and no one else—to say what the law is. Once we say what the
law is, that’s the end of it. After that, no one obliged to support the Constitution can fairly
assert that the Constitution means something different from what we said it meant.”); and
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 125 (2004) (defining judicial supremacy as “the notion that judges have the last word
when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning
of the Constitution for everyone”).
12. See infra Part V.
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such a mix of the laudable and contestable.13 It then surveys the debates over
Cooper and its proclamation of judicial supremacy that have taken place
ever since, each bout of criticism invariably followed by flurries of defenses
of the decision.14 I conclude with an effort to explain why Cooper remains
such a complex presence in the history of the Supreme Court.15
II. TO THE SUPREME COURT
How did the Justices arrive at the point in September 1958 where they
agreed it necessary to so starkly proclaim themselves supreme above all
challengers in giving meaning to the Constitution? The story of the road to
Cooper has often been told. But even for those who are familiar with its
basic contours, the sheer drama of the events—the twists and turns, the
striking scenes of confrontation, the personalities involved, and of course
the raw heroism of the black students who were at the center of the
maelstrom—remains gripping and shocking. The extraordinary background
to Cooper helps explain why the Court felt compelled in this case to
articulate such an extraordinary proclamation of its own authority.
In the spring of 1955, before the Supreme Court issued its second
Brown ruling providing guidelines for implementing school desegregation,16
the Little Rock school board approved a gradual desegregation plan for the
city’s public schools.17 Desegregation would begin with a small number of
black students attending one of the city’s high schools, Central High School,
the following fall; the plan called for all Little Rock schools to be
desegregated after eight years.18 The Little Rock chapter of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged
the school board’s plan in federal court in February 1956, arguing that the
gradualist plan failed to meet the requirements the Court laid out in Brown

13. See infra Parts II–IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
17. Soon after Brown I, the Little Rock District School Board stated, “It is our
responsibility to comply with Federal Constitutional Requirements and we intend to do so
when the Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be followed.” Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (quoting Statement, Little Rock District School Board, Supreme
Court Decision-Segregation in Public Schools (May 23, 1954)). On May 24, 1955, seven
days before the Court issued Brown II, the school board approved a desegregation plan. Id.
On the background to the school board’s moderate stance on desegregation during this
period, see JOHN KIRK, REDEFINING THE COLOR LINE: BLACK ACTIVISM IN LITTLE ROCK,
ARKANSAS, 1940–1970, at 92–94 (2002).
18. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8.
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II.19 In August 1956, Judge John E. Miller dismissed the NAACP’s lawsuit
and approved the plan.20 After more delays, the federal court issued a series
of additional orders to begin desegregation, and the Little Rock school
district began to prepare for its desegregation plan.
White segregationists in Arkansas then mobilized and turned the tide
against these modest desegregation efforts.21 Governor Orval Faubus, who
had initially appeared willing to quietly accept Brown,22 now adopted a
defiant tone, declaring he would not be forced to accept “a change to which
the people are overwhelmingly opposed.”23 The March 1956 release of the
“Southern Manifesto”—a statement signed by nearly every southern
member of Congress that denounced Brown as an “unwarranted decision”
and a “clear abuse of judicial power” and vowed to “use all lawful means to
bring about a reversal of this decision”24—fueled the incipient resistance
movement in Arkansas.25 In a November 1956 referenda, Arkansas voters
adopted a series of measures designed to oppose school desegregation.26 In
the spring of 1957, the Arkansas legislature passed a law that removed the
mandatory school attendance policy for children who were required to
attend integrated public schools.27 The legislature also established a State
Sovereignty Commission and empowered school boards to spend district
funds to pay for legal representation in lawsuits over integration.28 A federal
appeals court would describe the state’s machinations as “a systematic
campaign” that had the result of “undermin[ing] whatever confidence the
19. In the year following its introduction in the spring of 1955, the school board had
weakened its desegregation plan. The revised version included opening a new all-black high
school. KIRK, supra note 17, at 96–99.
20. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 866 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff’d, 243 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1957).
21. See Tony Badger, “The Forerunner of Our Opposition”: Arkansas and the Southern
Manifesto of 1956, 56 ARK. HIST. Q. 353, 354–55 (1997).
22. KIRK, supra note 17, at 89.
23. Badger, supra note 21, at 355. According to historian Tony Badger, “Faubus’s
moderate strategy in 1956 was predicated on the notion that concessions to segregationist
pressure would enable moderates like himself to stay in office and defuse the extremist threat.
Instead, he found that in a battle where one side is prepared to mount a righteous crusade to
defy the Supreme Court and the other wants to keep quiet, the extremists were going to win.”
Id. at 360.
24. 102 CONG. REC. 4459–64 (1956) (Declaration of Constitutional Principles).
25. Badger, supra note 21, 356–59.
26. These included: a constitutional amendment commanding the state legislature to
oppose “in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional desegregation decisions” in
Brown I and Brown II, Ark. Const. amend. 44 (repealed 1990); and a pupil assignment law,
Ark. Stat. §§ 80-1519 to 80-1524.
27. Ark. Stat. § 80-1525.
28. Ark. Stat. §§ 6-801 to 6-824. See generally Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 15
(E.D. Ark. 1958) (detailing resistance to school desegregation in Arkansas), rev’d, 257 F.2d
33 (8th Cir. 1958).
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public might have had in the plan to integrate the public schools.”29 Under
these increasingly volatile circumstances, Little Rock school authorities
made final preparations in the summer of 1957 to begin desegregation.
Governor Faubus had other plans. He now placed himself squarely at
the head of the segregationist resistance movement.30 On September 2, the
day before Central High School was scheduled to begin its school year, he
announced that as a concession to the majority of voters who opposed
desegregation and in response to the threat of violence, he would order
the National Guard to block enforcement of the desegregation plan at
Central High School.31 The next day, Judge Davies of the federal district
court ordered the school to proceed with the desegregation plan already
approved by the court.32 On the morning of September 4, nine black students
who had been allowed to enroll in Central High School—known to history
as the Little Rock Nine—arrived at their new school.33 Members of the
National Guard, acting under orders from Faubus, blocked them from
entering.34 The school board asked for a stay, which, on September 7, the
court denied.35 After a series of appeals, and negotiations with President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Faubus agreed to withdraw the National Guard—
which had remained in place with instructions to keep the black students out
of Central High School—and let the desegregation plan proceed.36 On
September 23, under the protection of the Little Rock Police Department,
the Little Rock Nine entered Central High School.37 But after withdrawing
the troops, Faubus did nothing to provide protection for the black students.38

29. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 35 (8th Cir. 1958).
30. On Faubus’s opportunistic evolution from racial moderate to diehard segregationist,
see KIRK, supra note 17, at 101–05, 113–14.
31. STATE OF ARK. EXEC. DEP’T., PROCLAMATION (1957), reprinted in Governor’s
Action, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 937, 937 (1957).
32. Order to Show Cause, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 938, 938–39 (1957).
33. On the Little Rock Nine, see KIRK, supra note 17, at 108–12.
34. Id. at 115, 117.
35. Board Seeks Stay, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 939, 941 (1957). “I have a Constitutional
duty and obligation from which I shall not shrink,” declared Judge Davies in denying the
petition. “In an organized society there can be nothing but ultimate confusion and chaos if
court decrees are flaunted, whatever the pretext. That we, and each of us, has a duty to
conform to the law of the land and the decrees of its duly constituted tribunals is too
elementary to require elaboration.” Id. at 940; see also Robert E. Baker, Little Rock’s Bid For
More Time Termed ‘Anemic’, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1957, at A1.
36. See Proceedings Against Governor, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 942, 942–63 (1957); JAMES
F. SIMON, EISENHOWER V. WARREN: THE BATTLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES ch. 11
(2018).
37. See ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT
SHOCKED THE NATION 170–74 (2007).
38. Id.
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With a large crowd of hostile whites amassed outside the school, the Nine
were pulled out of the school after just a few hours.39
President Eisenhower faced a crisis that not only made him look weak
in the eyes of the nation, but also embarrassed the nation in the eyes of the
world.40 Little Rock’s mayor sent the President desperate telegrams begging
him to act.41 Just two months before, the President had declared that he
could not “imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce me to
send federal troops . . . into any area to enforce the orders of a federal court.
. . .”42 Now, Eisenhower felt compelled to use his power to enforce school
desegregation in Little Rock. On September 24, he called in Army troops to
restore order and allow the desegregation plan to go forward.43 He delivered
a speech to the nation that evening about the crisis in which he denounced
the “demagogic extremists” and “disorderly mobs” that “have deliberately
prevented the carrying out of proper orders from a Federal Court. . . . Mob
rule cannot be allowed to override the decisions of our courts.”44
“We are now an occupied territory,” Faubus lamented in his own
address.45 “[B]y the use of Federal troops without proper request, rights just
as precious, if not more so, than integration have been trampled into the dust
under the boots of paratroopers or cut to pieces by their shiny unsheathed
bayonets.”46
Eight of the original nine black students attended Central High School
through the remainder of the school year.47 Their white classmates subjected

39. Id.
40. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ch. 4 (2000).
41. Telegram from Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann to President Dwight D. Eisenhower
(Sept. 24, 1957) (on file with the Eisenhower Digital Archives at https://www.eisenhower.
archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_little_rock/1957_09_24_Mann_to_DD
E.pdf) (“I am pleading to you as president of the United States in the interest of humanity,
law and order and because of democracy world wide [sic] to provide the necessary federal
troops. . . .”).
42. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference (July 17, 1957)
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-newsconference-298).
43. SIMON, supra note 36, at 306.
44. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Address to the American
People on the Situation in Little Rock (Sept. 24, 1957) (transcript available at https://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-and-television-address-the-american-people-thesituation-little-rock).
45. Text of Faubus Address on Little Rock Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1957, at
10.
46. Id.
47. The troops from the 101st Airborne Division were replaced by federalized National
Guardsmen, who remained at the school for the rest of the school year.
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them to a steady stream of harassment.48 Hundreds of white students were
suspended for their abusive behavior.49 The school was also subject to
regular bomb threats.50
The winter of 1958 saw a new round of litigation, and this one would
make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Little Rock school board filed
suit in federal court on February 20, 1958, seeking a delay in implementing
its desegregation plan.51 On June 20, Judge Harry Lemley approved a plan
that would delay desegregation until 1960.52 In his opinion, he emphasized
the resistance of whites in Little Rock to the desegregation plan, quoting a
vice principal at Central High School who described the experience of the
1957–58 academic year as one of “chaos, bedlam and turmoil. . . .”53 The
resulting “situation of tension and unrest among the school administrators,
the classroom teachers, the pupils, and the latters’ parents inevitably had an
adverse effect upon the educational program,” he worried.54 “[T]he orderly
administration of the school was practically disrupted” and “educational
standards have suffered.”55 The chaotic situation cannot be attributed to
“mere lawlessness,” Judge Lemley wrote.
Rather, the source of the trouble was the deep seated popular opposition
in Little Rock to the principle of integration, which, as is known, runs
counter to the pattern of southern life which has existed for over three
hundred years. The evidence also shows that to this opposition was
added the conviction of many of the people of Little Rock, that the
Brown decisions do not truly represent the law, and that by virtue of the

48. See, e.g., JACOWAY, supra note 37, at 214–41; KIRK, supra note 17, at 119–23;
MELBA PATTILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON’T CRY: A SEARING MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE TO
INTEGRATE LITTLE ROCK’S CENTRAL HIGH (1994); DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF
LITTLE ROCK 113–60 (1962).
49. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 327 (2004).
50. Id.
51. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D. Ark. 1958), rev’d, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1958).
52. Id. at 32.
53. Id. at 20–21.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id. The judge offered summaries of testimony by teachers and school staff detailing
the difficulties they faced. Id. at 22–25. Judge Lemley also wrote,
In reaching this conclusion [to grant the injunction] we are not unmindful of the admonition
of the Supreme Court that the vitality of those principles ‘cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them;’ here, however, as pointed out by the Board in its final
brief, the opposition to integration in Little Rock is more than a mere mental attitude; it has
manifested itself in overt acts which have actually damaged educational standards and which
will continue to do so if relief is not granted.
Id. at 26 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Edu., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
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1956–57 enactments, heretofore outlined, integration in the public
schools can be lawfully avoided.56

The situation, he concluded, justified granting a “breathing spell in Little
Rock. . . .”57
Lemley’s decision “caused jubilation among the ranks of segregationist
states,” according to news reports.58 It “will do much to re-establish the
normal and friendly relations which prevailed before here,” said Faubus.59 A
leader of the Mother’s League of Central High, a local segregationist group
formed in the midst of the Little Rock desegregation battle, hoped that the
delay would give the Supreme Court the opportunity to reverse Brown.60
The Court’s approval of the delay “shows that massive resistance works,”
said a Louisiana legislator.61 “This gives us a powerful new weapon with
which to protect our schools.”62 The Washington Post lamented that the
ruling in effect was an invitation to resistant southern school districts to “use
violence to obstruct the law.”63 Judge Lemley “has struck a severe blow at
the cause of integration in the public schools.”64
The lawyers of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(LDF) tried to bypass the federal appeals court and get the Supreme Court to
review Judge Lemley’s ruling.65 Although the LDF lawyers failed to
persuade the Supreme Court to take the case at this point, they soon found
success at the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.66 In an
August 18, 1958 opinion, the appeals court reversed the district court ruling.
“[T]he time has not yet come in these United States when an order of a
Federal Court must be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully
withdrawn in the face of violent and unlawful acts of individual citizens in
opposition thereto,” wrote the court.67 The Eighth Circuit then put a hold on
56. Id. at 21
57. Aaron, 163 F. Supp. at 27.
58. Little Rock News Hailed in the South, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 22, 1958, at 2.
59. U.S. Judge Lets Little Rock Halt Its Integration, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1958, at 1.
60. Id. at 30.
61. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 328.
62. Id.
63. Retreat at Little Rock, WASH. POST, June 23, 1958, at A12.
64. Id.; see also Little Rock Decision, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1958, at 16 (“Judge Lemley
has worked himself into the absurd position of saying that the public interest demands the
denial of the constitutional rights of citizens. On that theory anybody who takes the trouble to
organize a mob can force the suspension of free speech, free press, trial by jury, and every
other guarantee of liberty.”).
65. Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566, 567 (1958).
66. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1958); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN
THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 232–36 (1994) (detailing LDF efforts to get the case to the Supreme Court).
67. Aaron, 257 F.2d at 40.
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its order to allow the Supreme Court time to consider the school board’s
request for a petition for a writ of certiorari.68
The Little Rock school board appealed, and, in an extraordinary step,
the Supreme Court convened a special summer term to consider the case.69
After hearing arguments on August 28 and September 11, 1958, the Justices
issued a three-paragraph per curiam opinion on September 12, 1958, in
which they unanimously upheld the Eighth Circuit’s ruling.70 Because the
new school year was imminent, the Court explained, “we deem it important
to make prompt announcement of our judgment affirming the Court of
Appeals. The expression of the views supporting our judgment will be
prepared and announced in due course.”71
“[W]e figured that the Supreme Court would uphold justice,” was the
reaction of Ernest Green, one of the Little Rock Nine and the first to
graduate from Central High School.72 “We are pleased.”73 A leader of a local
segregationist group had a predictably different reaction, describing the
Court’s ruling as “one of the most unfortunate things which has ever
happened to our country in its existence.”74 Arkansas had recently passed a
law authorizing a special election to vote to close schools if they were
ordered to desegregate,75 and on September 27, the citizens of Little Rock
voted to close their schools rather than comply with the court order to
initiate a desegregation plan.76
The Court issued its full opinion in Cooper v. Aaron on September
29.77 The opinion opens with a reference to Faubus’s claim “that there is no
duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court’s
considered interpretation of the United States Constitution”78 and then
returns in its famous closing paragraphs to the question of constitutional
interpretative authority.79 Between these dramatic bookends, the opinion
offers a straightforward summary and legal assessment of the Little Rock
situation. Following a detailed review of the desegregation saga in Little
68. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1958).
69. Id. at 14; SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION
142–43 (2010).
70. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 5.
71. Id. at 5 n*, (reprinting per curiam order announced on Sept. 12, 1958).
72. Claude Sitton, Faubus Orders 4 Schools Shut, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1958, at 1, 8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Act of Sept. 12, 1958, No. 4, Ark. Gen. Assemb., reprinted in School Closing—
Arkansas, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1048, 1048–49 (1958).
76. Claude Sitton, Little Rock Vote Supports Faubus on Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 1958, at 1, 52.
77. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id. at 17–20.
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Rock,80 the opinion lays out the Court’s reasons for affirming the appeals
court in rejecting any more delays in implementing the school desegregation
plan.81 “One may well sympathize with the position of the Board in the face
of the frustrating conditions which have confronted it, but, regardless of the
Board’s good faith, the actions of the other state agencies responsible for
those conditions compel us to reject the Board’s legal position,” the Court
explained.82 “The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed
or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the
actions of the Governor and Legislature. . . . [L]aw and order are not here to
be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional
rights.”83
With this, the Court had done the work of giving its answer to the legal
dispute in Little Rock. “What has been said, in the light of the facts
developed, is enough to dispose of the case.”84 But the Justices had more
that they wanted to say. In the opinion’s closing paragraphs, they returned to
the issue they had flagged in the opinion’s opening paragraph: the question
of judicial authority on matters of constitutional dispute. They would take
the opportunity to provide their “answer” to “the premise of the actions of
the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the
Brown case.”85
In providing this answer, the opinion presented the most direct, forceful
endorsement of judicial supremacy the Supreme Court has ever made.
III. BUILDING THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
In making the case for the Supreme Court’s supremacy over all others
in assigning meaning to the Constitution, the Justices found support in the
fact that many outside the Court had been making similar arguments in
recent years. Although Cooper’s assertion of judicial authority went beyond
anything the Supreme Court had said before, it was an assertion that a
growing chorus of people wanted the Justices to make.
Extrajudicial support for expansive judicial authority, a story with roots
tracing to the beginnings of the Republic,86 grew in reaction to the South’s
campaign of organized resistance to Brown. The faith in the power of the
Supreme Court expressed in Cooper was in large part the product of a
80. Id. at 5–14.
81. Id. at 14–17.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16.
84. Id. at 17.
85. Id.
86. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 11; Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
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campaign, inside and outside the Court, to defend Brown. An array of critics
challenged Brown, ranging from segregationists87 to liberal law professors
uncomfortable with its legal reasoning.88 Defenders of the decision
countered with increasingly strident defenses of the Court and its authority
to interpret the Constitution.
Although the backlash to Brown took time to coalesce, by the point the
Court issued its implementation ruling (Brown II) in the spring of 1955,
segregationist opposition was steadily gaining momentum. 89 The basic legal
claim driving the South’s resistance effort was that the Court simply got it
wrong in its conclusion that school segregation violated the Constitution,
and a judicial misreading of the Constitution such as this could and should
be resisted.90 A resolution the Virginia legislature adopted in early 1956 is
representative. The Brown decision, it declared,
constitutes an unlawful and unconstitutional assumption of power which
does not exist. An agency created by a document to which sovereign
states were parties cannot lawfully amend the creating document when
that document clearly specifies in Article V thereof the manner of
amendment. . . . Until such time as the Constitution of the United States
may be amended in the manner provided by that Constitution, this
commonwealth is under no obligation to accept supinely an unlawful
decree of the Supreme Court of the United States based upon an
authority which is not found in the Constitution of the United States nor
any amendment thereto. Rather this commonwealth is in honor bound to
act to ward off the attempted exercise of a power which does not exist
lest other excesses be encouraged.91

The Georgia legislature issued its own nullification resolution, stating,
“[I]t is clear that [the Supreme] Court has deliberately resolved to disobey
the Constitution of the United States, and to flout and defy the Supreme Law
of the Land[.]”92 Other southern states issued similar proclamations.93
87. See, e.g., NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S, at 67–81, 126–49 (1969); KLARMAN, supra note
46, at 385–421.
88. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–35 (1959).
89. BARTLEY, supra note 87, at 67–81.
90. Id. at 126–49.
91. Act of Jan. 11, 1956, Va. Gen. Assemb., reprinted in Interposition and
Nullification—Virginia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 252, 253 (1956) (Virginia Nullification
Statement).
92. H.R. 185, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1956), reprinted in Interposition and
Nullification—Georgia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 438, 440 (1956).
93. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 2, 1956, No. 42, Ala. Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess., reprinted in
Interposition and Nullification—Alabama, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 437, 437 (1956); S. Con. Res.
No. 125, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1956), reprinted in Interposition and
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The most prominent challenge to Brown and to the authority of the
Court came in what became known as the Southern Manifesto, the March
1956 statement signed by almost all southern members of Congress, which
denounced the Supreme Court’s “clear abuse of judicial power” in Brown.94
The law must be based in a community’s “habits, traditions, and way of life”
of a community, insisted the document’s signatories.95 But with its Brown
decision, the Supreme Court abandoned “established law.”96 The Justices
“substituted their personal, political, and social ideas for the established law
of the land.”97 This was nothing more than an exercise of “naked power.”98
The Southern Manifesto helped transform scattered discontent and
prevalent uncertainty into a united resistance movement. According to
historian C. Vann Woodward, with the Southern Manifesto, “The law of the
land had been clearly defined by the Supreme Court of the United States,
and that definition had been just as clearly rejected by responsible
spokesmen of millions of our people . . . [This] was a real constitutional
crisis that the country was facing.”99 Harvard Law professor Paul Freund
wrote that the Manifesto posed “not only a crisis in race relations but—what
could in the long run be even more shattering—a crisis in the role of the
Supreme Court as the authoritative voice of our highest law.”100
The Southern Manifesto’s critics regularly voiced judicial supremacist
arguments, sounding themes that were quite similar to those the Justices
invoked in Cooper two years later.101 In December 1956, a hundred leading
lawyers and law professors signed a statement defending the Supreme Court
against the Manifesto’s challenges.102 The attacks against the Court, they
wrote, “have been so reckless in their abuse, so heedless of the value of
judicial review and so dangerous in fomenting disrespect for our highest law
that they deserve to be repudiated by the legal profession and by every

Nullification—Mississippi, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 440, 440–43 (1956); S.J. Res. S.514, Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1956), reprinted in Interposition and Nullification—South
Carolina, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 443, 443 (1956).
94. 102 CONG. REC. 4459–64 (1956) (Declaration of Constitutional Principles).
95. Id. at 4460.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 169 (rev. ed. 1957).
100. Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1118
(2014) (quoting Paul A. Freund, Editorial, Understanding the School Decision, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 26, 1956, at 18).
101. Id. at 1058 (citing the debate sparked by the Southern Manifesto as evidence that
“widespread notions of judicial supremacy actually preceded Cooper”).
102. George W. Pepper, et al., Recent Attacks upon the Supreme Court: A Statement by
Members of the Bar, 42 A.B.A. J. 1128, 1128–29 (1956).
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thoughtful citizen. . . . In cases of disagreement, we have established the
judiciary to interpret the Constitution for us.”103
Perhaps the most prominent defender of the Court’s supremacy in
determining constitutional meaning was President Eisenhower—a point rich
with irony, since Eisenhower held serious personal reservations toward
Brown.104 From the time the Court announced Brown, the President openly
expressed his doubts about the limited ability of the law to change people’s
beliefs and attitudes; in private he said that Brown had set back racial
progress in the South.105 When reporters pressed him for his views,
Eisenhower avoided directly expressing his approval of Brown. Rather, he
said that he accepted the supremacy of the Court on matters of constitutional
interpretation. “The Supreme Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold
the constitutional processes in this country, and I will obey,” Eisenhower
said at a news conference two days after the Court handed down Brown.106
Two years later, as the forces of the massive resistance campaign gathered
strength, he said, “I think it makes no difference whether or not I endorse
[Brown]. The Constitution is as the Supreme Court interprets it; and I must
conform to that and do my very best to see that it is carried out in this
country.”107
The press also made the case for the supremacy of the Supreme Court.
“No American is compelled to like the decisions of the Supreme Court,”
wrote the editors of the Washington Post in September 1957.108 “But for
more than a century and a half of history and tradition the Supreme Court
has been the final interpreter of the Constitution. Every American, by virtue
of his citizenship in the Union, is enjoined to accept and obey the orders of
the Federal Courts.”109
Between the time the Justices called a special summer session to hear
the Cooper case and the release of the Court’s written opinion, the Justices’
commitment to using the case as a platform to issue a bold defense of the
103. Id. at 1128.
104. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 145–49; Michael S. Mayer, With Much
Deliberation and Some Speed: Eisenhower and the Brown Decision, 52 J. S. HIST. 43, 60
(1986).
105. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 324–25.
106. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference (May 19, 1954)
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232016).
107. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference (Sept. 5, 1956)
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233130); see also President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference (Mar. 21, 1956) (transcript
available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233050) (“[R]emember that the
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is our basic law.”).
108. To Preserve the Constitution, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1957, at A12.
109. Id. The “true subversives,” the Post explained, were those “who have cultivated
contempt for the Supreme Court and disrespect for law.” Id.
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broader principle of judicial interpretive supremacy only grew, a
development fueled by the events taking place outside the Court.110 As the
Justices considered Cooper, Governor Faubus and his segregationist allies in
Arkansas were mobilizing against federally enforced desegregation. At a
special session of the Arkansas General Assembly, where Faubus declared
himself locked in a struggle for “states rights and constitutional
government,”111 the legislature passed a collection of measures designed to
preserve racial segregation in the state’s schools, including a bill authorizing
the governor to shut them down rather than desegregate.112 Faubus
disavowed his earlier concession in which he accepted Brown as the law of
the land, claiming that he had only said so because the Eisenhower
administration had forced him.113 He declared that he would “probably”
close down the schools rather than allow the desegregation plan to go
forward, since “it is my feeling that integration could not be accomplished
without disorder and bloodshed.”114
Meanwhile, the northern press condemned Faubus’s defiant statements
and praised the Court for standing its ground. “The children of Little Rock,
white and Negro alike,” wrote the editors of the New York Herald Tribune,
“are taught in school to respect the Constitution; they must not be given the
spectacle of a breach of that document, as interpreted by the highest court in
the land, whether the breach is committed by a mob or by the executive
power of the city or state.”115 In rejecting the pleas for more delays, the
Court “has done what its integrity and the nation’s honor required it to do,”
wrote the Newark Evening News.116
At oral argument at the Supreme Court, the Justices were given an upclose display of the ways in which the Little Rock crisis risked undermining
their authority. Richard Butler, the lawyer for the Little Rock school board,
tried to explain to the Justices why the board was asking for a delay in

110. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 77–79 (1979); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme
Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 397–403
(1982).
111. JACOWAY, supra note 37, at 260.
112. Id. at 259–60; Claude Sitton, Faubus Disavows Yielding to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 1958, at 1, 19; School Closing—Arkansas, supra note 75.
113. Sitton, supra note 112. According to Faubus, “the laws of the land are the laws made
by Congress and the Supreme Court or other courts merely passes upon those laws as to
whether they are constitutional or in conflict with other laws.” Id.
114. Jack V. Fox, Faubus Hints He Will Close Central High, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1958,
at A1.
115. Editorial Comment on Decision by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1958, at
56.
116. Id.
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implementing its school desegregation plan.117 A two-and-a-half year delay,
he explained, would give time so that “a national policy could definitely be
established” and “laws could be tested so that the people would know, the
people who want to obey the final word.”118 Justice Felix Frankfurter shot
back, asking why the Court’s rulings in the two Brown decisions were not
considered “national policy[.]”119 Chief Justice Warren asked what would
happen if school districts across the South demanded more legal clarity
before they were willing to desegregate. Butler explained that the
desegregation should be delayed while the people in Arkansas “have a doubt
in their mind and a right to have a doubt,” in large part because the state’s
leaders, starting with its governor, were urging them to question whether
they might avoid desegregation. This caused the Chief Justice to lose his
patience: “I have never heard such an argument made in a Court of Justice
before. I have never heard a lawyer say that the statement of a Governor as
to what was legal or illegal should control the action of any court.”120
The Justices received a steady stream of expressions of support for the
Court’s preeminence as the nation’s constitutional authority. Outside
observers saw the drama in the courtroom as providing an object lesson in
the importance of the Supreme Court. James Reston of the New York Times
wrote a column that described of the Court’s power in reverential terms: “It
was the court, in all its majesty, that was in command today. . . .”121
Briefs filed in Cooper and statements made at the next round of oral
arguments further bolstered the Justices’ sense of their own interpretative
authority. The LDF lawyers defined the issue in their brief as “a national test
of the vitality of the principles enunciated in Brown v. Board of
Education.”122 But the issue also transcended the school desegregation
struggle, they wrote. It involved “not only vindication of the constitutional
rights declared in Brown, but indeed the very survival of the Rule of Law.
This case affords this Court the opportunity to restate in unmistakable terms
both the urgency of proceeding with desegregation and the supremacy of all
constitutional rights over bigots—big and small.”123 At oral argument, LDF
lead counsel Thurgood Marshall pressed the same points, chiding

117. Excerpts from Oral Argument Before Supreme Court on Question of Integration,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1958, at 10.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. James Reston, The Court in Command, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1958, at 10.
122. Brief for John Aaron, et al., Respondents at 4, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(Misc. No. 1).
123. Id. at 5.
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Arkansas’s lawyers for casting doubt on “the power or authority of the
Supreme Court.”124
Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin reinforced the NAACP’s argument.
“The element in this case is lawlessness[,]” he said at oral argument. 125 “In
Little Rock, the people decided they were going to defy the laws of this
country.”126 The issue transcended Little Rock, and it transcended the battle
over school desegregation. “There isn’t a single policeman who isn’t going
to watch this Court and what it has to say about this matter that doesn’t have
to deal with people everyday who don’t like the law he is trying to
administer and enforce. And he has to go against that public feeling and will
and do his duty.”127 He argued that the school board should “tell the people
that this Supreme Court has spoken; that’s the law of the land; it’s binding;
we’ve got to do it[.] . . . [T]hey have a duty as a citizen, the highest duty of a
citizen, to obey the law and to support the Constitution.”128 The Supreme
Court must declare “in a manner that cannot be misunderstood, throughout
the length and breadth of this land: There can be no equality of justice for
our people if the law steps aside, even for a moment, at the command of
force and violence.”129
On September 12, Chief Justice Warren read the Court’s unanimous
three paragraph per curiam order affirming the court of appeals and thereby
denying the school board’s request for a delay, and noting that the Justices
would release their full opinion “in due course.”130 Faubus responded by
signing into law the various pro-segregation bills the Arkansas legislature
had recently passed, declaring that he would shut down Little Rock’s four
high schools so as to prevent “impending violence and disorder[,]” and
calling for a referendum so that Little Rock could decide whether to close all
its schools rather than desegregate.131 “Gov. Faubus Defies Court” ran the
headline in the next day’s Boston Globe.132
124. Oral Arguments at 46, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), reprinted in 54
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 711 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS].
125. Id. at 58, reprinted in 54 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 723.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 61, reprinted in 54 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 726.
129. Id. at 62, reprinted in 54 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 727; see also TONY
FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL 182 (2007) (noting that Solicitor General Rankin’s words in
oral argument likely further strengthened the Court’s commitment to a strong judicial
supremacist statement in Cooper).
130. Anthony Lewis, Court Bars Little Rock Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1958, at 1;
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 5 n* (1958) (reprinting per curiam order announced on Sept.
12, 1958).
131. Claude Sitton, Faubus Orders 4 Schools Shut, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1958, at 1, 8.
132. Gov. Faubus Defies Court, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1958, at 1.
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IV. DECLARING SUPREMACY
The Court would release its full written opinion in Cooper on
September 29. To signal the Court’s unanimous commitment to Brown, each
of the nine Justices signed the opinion,133 but its primary author was Justice
William Brennan.134 On September 17, Brennan circulated a draft of the
opinion to the other Justices.135 Most of its eighteen pages were taken up
with a detailed account of the Little Rock desegregation saga, along with an
explanation that the Supremacy Clause commanded state and local officials
to comply with federal court orders.136 After Brennan circulated his draft, the
other Justices offered editorial suggestions. A common theme in these
suggestions was the need to do more to emphasize the Court’s authority.137
Chief Justice Warren felt Brennan’s opening was “rather dry.” 138 Justice
Black urged Brennan to use “more punch and vigor. . . .” 139 The Justices
wanted the opinion to respond to the defiant southern states’ claims that the
Court had been wrong to rule as it did in Brown and that therefore the states
were not bound to follow its mandate.140
In his revisions, Brennan strengthened the Court’s defense of its own
interpretive supremacy. The claim that Marbury established “the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution” Brennan had initially followed with a qualified defense,
noting that Marbury “was not without its critics, then and even now[.]”141
He then concluded: “The country has long since accepted it as a sound,
correct and permanent interpretation.”142 The revised version had more of
the courage of its convictions: “the basic principle that the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution” is “a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”143 The revised
version also added the stronger opening paragraph, which made clear from

133. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 298 (1977); BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 299–300
(1983).
134. Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 79; STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 69, at 147–52;
SCHWARTZ, supra note 133, at 295–301.
135. Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 79; SCHWARTZ, supra note 133, at 295.
136. SCHWARTZ, supra note 133, at 295.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 297.
139. Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 79.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 80.
142. Id. at 80.
143. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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the start that the case raised foundational questions about the Court’s
authority.144
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in a letter to Justice John Marshall Harlan II
several days after the first round of oral arguments in Cooper, articulated his
belief in the need for a forceful statement of the Court’s authority. The key
to making school desegregation a reality, he argued, was to win over
southern moderates. 145 Rather than trying to persuade this group to accept
Brown “on the merits,” Frankfurter insisted “they ought to be won, and I
believe will be won, to the transcending issue of the Supreme Court as the
authoritative organ of what the Constitution requires.”146 “[T]he ultimate
hope for the peaceful solution of the basic problem,” Frankfurter explained
in a letter to Chief Justice Warren, “largely depends on winning the support
of the lawyers of the South for the overriding issue of obedience to the
Court’s decision.”147
Justice Harlan drafted a revised version of the closing section of the
opinion that he shared with some of the other justices.148 Unlike Brennan’s
draft, his did not cite Marbury to defend the principle of judicial interpretive
supremacy. He referenced instead the constitutional oath provision, which
“embraces of course both acts of Congress and the judgments of this Court,
which under our federal system has the final responsibility for constitutional
adjudication.”149 Brennan pushed back, defending his use of Marbury “and
the detailed discussion in my draft of the Court’s responsibility for the
exposition of the law of the Constitution.”150 This point, Brennan said, “is a
very essential part of what I believe our opinion should contain.”151
By the time of the fourth draft of Cooper—the version that, with only
minor stylistic changes, the Court would issue on September 29152—
Brennan, with the encouragement of his colleagues, had elevated the
opinion’s dramatic elements as well as its authoritative tone. Rather than
144. Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 81.
145. FREYER, supra note 129, at 160.
146. Id. (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice John Marshall Harlan II
(Sept. 2, 1958)).
147. Id. at 198 (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Warren
(Sept. 11, 1958)); see also id. at 189 (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to C.C.
Burlingham (Nov. 12, 1958) in which Frankfurter argues that the Court could win over
moderate southern lawyers, not because they want desegregation, but because they “will
gradually realize that there is a transcending issue, namely, respect for law as determined so
impressively by a unanimous Court in construing the Constitution of the United States”).
148. FREYER, supra note 129, at 177; Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 79; SCHWARTZ,
supra note 133, at 298.
149. FREYER, supra note 129, at 178.
150. Id. at 179.
151. Id.
152. Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 81–82.
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opening with a prosaic factual recitation of the developments that brought
the case to the Court, the opinion now began with a striking rendering of the
larger stakes at issue. Justice Black had drafted the bold opening, and Justice
Brennan incorporated it without change.153 The case “raises questions of the
highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government.
. . . Specifically, it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of
Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in Brown
v. Board of Education[.]”154
After defining the larger stakes of the case, the opinion then turns back
to the details of the Little Rock controversy and the particular legal issues
presented. Then, twelve pages later, the opinion makes its pivot: “What has
been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to dispose of the
case. However, we should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor
and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown
case.”155 This then paved the way for the Court’s declaration that “the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the Constitution” and “the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land[.]”156
Cooper was an overwhelmingly popular opinion outside the South. The
Justices “laid down the law of this land,” wrote the editors of the New York
Times.157 The ruling “restates once more the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy and the basic principle, recognized as fundamental to the
American system ever since the days of John Marshall, ‘that the Federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.’”158 The
ruling
simply reiterates in strong and clear language, understandable even to the
most fanatical segregationist, that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Constitution is the law, that the desegregation decision stands, that
neither direct nullification nor indirect evasion will be tolerated, that

153. SCHWARTZ, supra note 133, at 300–01.
154. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
155. Id. at 17.
156. Id. at 18. The final draft also added language, urged by Justice Harlan, emphasizing
the agreement of recent appointees to the Court with the basic principle of Brown.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 135, at 299. “The basic decision in Brown was unanimously reached
by this Court only after the case had been briefed and twice argued and the issues had been
given the most serious consideration. Since the first Brown opinion three new Justices have
come to the Court. They are at one with the Justices still on the Court who participated in that
basic decision as to its correctness, and that decision is now unanimously reaffirmed.”
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19.
157. Spelling Out Desegregation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1958, at 30.
158. Id.
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state officials are as subject to Federal law as anyone else, that violent
resistance to this law is futile[.]159

“The Court has silenced once and for all the segregationists who have
placed preservation of law and order above constitutional rights,” wrote the
editors of the Chicago Defender.160 An approving C. Vann Woodward
described the tone of the Cooper decision as “judicial rhetoric . . .
amounting to anger.”161
V. COOPER’S CRITICS
That most of the white South would denounce what the Court did in
Cooper was surely expected. Perhaps less expected was that after the Little
Rock crisis receded from the headlines, and after Brown had been elevated
to iconic status in the consciousness of the public and the legal academy,
Cooper has remained the target of a persistent stream of criticism and even
ridicule.
One of the earliest and most influential of these critiques of Cooper
came from Yale law professor Alexander Bickel. In his classic 1962 book,
The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel chided defenders of Brown, including
the justices themselves, for failing to adequately respond to the attacks on
Brown by the white South.162 Southerners attacked the Court in Brown for
having “botched the job that [Chief Justice John] Marshall describes in
Marbury v. Madison; pretty obviously, the Court had performed some other
function, not the one there indicated.”163 The Court’s response in Cooper
was to assert that based on Marbury,
the Court is empowered to lay down the law of the land, and citizens
must accept it uncritically. Whatever the Court lays down is right, even
if wrong, because the Court and only the Court speaks in the name of the
Constitution. Its doctrines are not to be questioned; indeed, they are
hardly a fit subject for comment. The Court has spoken. The Court must
be obeyed. There must be good order and peaceable submission to lawful
authority.164

This, Bickel argued, was the essence of the Court’s pronouncement in
Cooper. Bickel’s arch hyperbole made this perhaps the most memorable of
159. Id.
160. Our Opinions: The Court Asserts Its Power, CHI. DEFENDER, Oct. 11, 1958, at 10.
161. C. Vann Woodward, The South and the Law of the Land, 26 COMMENTARY 369, 370
(1958).
162. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 244–65 (1962).
163. Id. at 264.
164. Id.
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Cooper takedowns, but his was only an early exemplar of a long line of
Cooper critiques by legal luminaries.
From across the ideological spectrum, scholars have made sport out of
taking shots at Cooper’s judicial supremacist language. The Court got
“carried away with its own sense of righteousness” in Cooper, wrote
University of Chicago law professor Philip Kurland.165 He also described
Cooper as an expression of the “the Court’s Louis XIV’s notion of itself,
l’etat, c’est moi[.]’”166 “[I]n the drama of the occasion,” wrote J. Harvie
Wilkinson, a law professor who is now a respected federal judge, “the Court
went somewhat overboard, with a sweeping and unprecedented assertion of
its own authority and place.”167 Cooper’s proclamation of the Court’s
authority, he added, was “both unrealistic and undesirable.”168 Another
scholar dismissed Cooper’s “bombast,”169 and Professor Sanford Levinson
has described Cooper’s declaration of the Court’s interpretive supremacy as
“really quite preposterous in its depiction of American history.”170 “If a
student wrote such a statement in a final exam,” he added, “it would receive
a D from a generous grader[.]”171 Larry Kramer referred to Cooper’s
supremacist claims as “just bluster and puff.”172
165. Philip B. Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 643
(1970).
166. Philip B. Kurland, “Brown v. Board of Education was the Beginning”: The School
Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954–1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
309, 328 (1979).
167. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954–1978, at 92 (1979).
168. Id. at 93.
169. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 310 (1992); see also id. at 293
(describing Cooper as an “atavistic rhetorical demand for absolute submission.”).
170. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 276 (Sanford Levinson
ed., 5th ed. 2010).
171. Id.
172. KRAMER, supra note 11, at 221; see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 46–50 (1988); TUSHNET, supra note 11, at 6–32; Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 924–27 (1990); Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible
Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (online source on file with
author) (criticizing Cooper’s “unprecedented assertions of judicial power were, and remain,
entirely inconsistent with how all courts, including the Supreme Court, operate”); Ed Whelen,
This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—September 29, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/day-liberal-judicial-activism-september-29ed-whelan-5/ (describing Cooper as the first time the Court asserted the “myth of judicial
supremacy”); David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1065, 1080 (2008) (“This issue of judicial supremacy is complex and difficult. The Court’s
position in Cooper, taken at face value, seems to go too far.”);
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 n.155 (1964) (contrasting Cooper’s
judicial supremacist position with Marbury’s more moderate position); WHITTINGTON, supra
note 11, at 2–3.
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The most controversial challenge to Cooper came in 1986, when
Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave a speech at Tulane University
entitled “The Law of the Constitution.” In celebrating the Constitution,
Meese insisted on the need to distinguish the document’s text from the
Court’s interpretation of that text.173 “[A]lthough the point may seem
obvious,” he said, “there have been those down through our history—and
especially, it seems, in our own time—who have denied the distinction
between the Constitution and constitutional law.”174 To drive home his
point, he took aim at Cooper:
Some thirty years ago, in the midst of great racial turmoil, our highest
Court seemed to succumb to this very temptation. By a flawed reading of
our Constitution and Marbury v. Madison, and an even more faulty
syllogism of legal reasoning, the Court in a 1958 case called Cooper v.
Aaron appeared to arrive at conclusions about its own power that would
have shocked men like John Marshall and Joseph Story. . . . The logic of
Cooper v. Aaron was, and is, at war with the Constitution, at war with
the basic principles of democratic government, and at war with the very
meaning of the rule of law. 175

Meese’s remarks were met with scathing criticism. American Civil
Liberty Union executive director Ira Glasser denounced them as “an
invitation to lawlessness and a breach of constitutional duty to uphold the
law.”176 He questioned whether Meese also sought to undermine Brown.177
“Why Give That Speech?” asked the headline of a Washington Post
editorial.178 The Attorney General’s distinction between the Constitution and
constitutional decisions, and his claim that the Court’s decisions are “not
permanent and fixed or immune from challenge” was, the Post’s editors

Cooper’s critics often cite the long and impressive history of critics of judicial supremacy.
Exhibit A in this discussion is usually Abraham Lincoln, who famously warned “if the policy
of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed
by decisions of the Supreme Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers”
President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) (transcript available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp). Other prominent critics of judicial
supremacy include James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt,
and Franklin Roosevelt. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 11; KRAMER, supra note 11;
BICKEL, supra note 162.
173. Meese, supra note 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Ronald J. Ostrow, Meese’s View That Court Doesn’t Make Law Scored, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1986, at A1, A27.
177. Ira Glasser, Letter to the Editors, Cooper v. Aaron: What Did Mr. Meese Mean?
WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1986, at A14.
178. Editorial, Why Give That Speech?, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at A18.
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noted, “self-evident[.]”179 But the speech was “very troublesome” because of
the “signal” he was sending that rulings might not bind anyone beyond the
parties to litigation.180 Failing to make clear that court rulings do indeed
extend beyond litigants “is to permit the inference that a Supreme Court
decision has no general applicability and that citizens may choose to ignore
rulings at will. That’s an invitation to constitutional chaos and an expression
of contempt for the federal judiciary and the rule of law.”181 Former
Attorney General Ramsey Clark dismissed Meese’s speech as “essentially a
clumsy, vague assault on law” and an expression of “unusual notions[.]”182
In response, Meese backtracked somewhat. He explained that he
believed constitutional decisions are indeed “law” and “they are the law of
the land in the sense that they do indeed have general applicability and
deserve the greatest respect from all Americans.”183 He defended “[t]he
process of debating, litigating and legislating in response to a constitutional
decision one thinks wrong. . . . This process demonstrates that dialogue
among our political institutions and among the American people helps us

179. Id. See also Stuart Taylor, Meese and the Storm Over the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 1986, at A20 (“Jefferson said it. Jackson said it. So did Lincoln and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.”). Taylor noted that Meese “often makes potentially far-reaching but
fundamentally ambiguous statements about issues of great profundity and complexity without
spelling out what he means.” Id.
180. Why Give That Speech?, supra note 178.
181. Id.; see also Paul Brest, Meese, the Lawman, Calls for Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1986, at 23 (defending “[o]ur tradition of judicial supremacy” based on the inability of the
political branches to “develop[] trustworthy procedures for assessing the constitutionality of
their enactments”); id. (“Our tradition of according the judicial branch the last word on
constitutional questions reflects our dedication to the rule of law.”); Jack Greenberg, Letter to
the Editor, Arbitrary Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1986, at A34 (“For all practical purposes,
Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d’s argument that the Supreme Court does not decide what
the law is except for individual cases means that in his mind he is the law.”); Anthony Lewis,
Law or Power? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23 (accusing Meese of “making a calculated
assault on the idea of law in this country”); id. (“[T]o argue that no one owes respect to a
Supreme Court decision unless he was actually a party to the case . . . is to invite anarchy.”);
Michael Kinsley, Meese’s Stink Bomb, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at 19 (describing Meese’s
speech as a “jurisprudential stink bomb”); Howard Kurtz, Meese’s View on Court Rulings
Assailed, Defended, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1986, at A12.
182. Ramsey Clark, Enduring Constitutional Issues, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1987).
Although the bulk of commentary ran sharply critical, Meese had his defenders, including
some Reagan administration critics. In its essentials, Mark Tushnet wrote, Meese’s speech
“was obviously correct[.]” Mark Tushnet, Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, and
Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1987). Walter Dellinger
declared Meese’s basic point about the Court and the Constitution “absolutely right.” Kurtz,
supra note 181. “From Jackson to Lincoln to FDR,” Dellinger added, “there is a strong
tradition in defense of this argument.” Id.
183. Edwin Meese III, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1986, at
A21.
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follow our supreme law, the Constitution.”184 Meese’s defenders insisted
that his critique of Cooper was not with the holding but with, as one of
Meese’s aides put it, “the pretentious obiter dictum the court saw fit to
append to that decision.”185
VI. MAKING SENSE OF COOPER
How to make sense of Cooper? Why has a decision that is so obviously
right in so many ways become the target of such a persistent barrage of
attacks? And why, even in the face of these attacks, does the decision retain
such a prominent, even revered place in our constitutional history? In this
section, I offer three observations to help explain Cooper’s distinctive
position in the canon of great Supreme Court opinions.
A. The Cooper Two-Step
In Cooper, the justices engaged three overlapping issues: racial
segregation, the rule of law, and the rule of the Supreme Court. Cooper’s
treatment of the first issue was most notable at the time of the decision, and
it is probably what the decision is best remembered for today. Cooper’s
resonant assertion of the unconstitutionality of state-mandated segregation
in schools and the rightness of Brown provided a principled commitment to
racial equality that still resonates today. The Justices memorably
emphasized their united commitment to Brown by taking the unusual step of
listing each of the nine Justices as the joint authors of the opinion.
Cooper also staked out a clear position on the rule of law, denouncing
the effects of the segregationists’ massive resistance campaign and insisting
that “violence and disorder” could not justify denying constitutional
rights.186 This point received widespread approbation at the time and ever
since.187
The third issue on which the justices staked out a position in Cooper
was on the authority of the Supreme Court. This position is found in

184. Id.
185. Gary L. McDowell, What Mr. Meese Means (Cont’d.), WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1986, at
A18.
186. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). On Cooper as a statement on the rule of
law, see Christopher W. Schmidt, “The Civilizing Hand of Law”: Defending the Legal
Process in the Civil Rights Era, RHETORICAL PROCESS AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS 31–53 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2016); see also Farber, supra note 110.
187. See, e.g., Spelling Out, supra note 157 (praising the Court for writing an opinion that
“utterly rejects the anarchic theory that violence and disorder stimulated by actions of the
Governor or other authorities of a state can be permitted to undermine the constitutional
rights of citizens as defined by the high tribunal”).
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Cooper’s sweeping concluding proclamation of the Court’s exclusive
prerogative on matters of constitutional interpretation.188
Of these three sides to Cooper, the first two have stood the test of time
while the third remains contested. One of the challenges in assessing Cooper
is the difficulty in speaking about the third issue—the contestable claim to
judicial interpretive supremacy—without calling into question the first two.
Thus, we have what we might call the Cooper two-step: critics of judicial
supremacy attack Cooper; in response, critics of these critics accuse them of
attacking Brown or undermining the rule of law. This often leads to a
strategic retreat by Cooper’s critics. The Meese episode provides the most
famous example of the Cooper two-step.
Like the parable of the elephant and the blind men, it can be difficult to
talk about Cooper because the opinion means different things to different
people at different times.
B. The Politics of Judicial Supremacy
Bolstering the authority of the Supreme Court has often held political
advantages, and not only for the Court itself. Consider the case of President
Eisenhower. He was skeptical of the Brown ruling. In terms of his views
about the Court’s interpretive supremacy, his skepticism manifested in
contradictory ways. His apparent belief that the Court got it wrong in Brown
necessarily implied skepticism toward the Court’s interpretive supremacy.
But he also fell back on interpretive supremacy to justify his actions to
enforce Brown without taking responsibility for the decision itself. In his
address to the nation after sending the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division
to Little Rock, Eisenhower said that he was acting to prevent “anarchy” and
“mob rule,” which was undermining the nation’s standing in the world.189
“Our personal opinions about the [Supreme Court’s school desegregation]
decision have no bearing on the matter of enforcement; the responsibility
and authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution are very
clear.”190 He called on white southerners to “respect the law even when they
disagree with it.”191 What he did not do was to make any statement about
school desegregation or about the Court’s ruling in Brown. As he wrote in a
private correspondence later in the fall of 1957, “[M]y main interest is not in
the integration or segregation question. . . . The point is that specific orders
188. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17–21.
189. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Address to the American
People on the Situation in Little Rock (Sept. 24, 1957) (transcript available at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233623).
190. Id.
191. Id. See also id. (“Proper and sensible observance of the law then demanded the
respectful obedience which the nation has a right to expect from all its people.”).
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of our courts, taken in accordance with the terms of the Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, must be upheld.”192
A year later, as the Court was about to consider the Cooper case,
Eisenhower’s strategic embrace of judicial interpretive supremacy remained
unchanged. When a reporter pressed Eisenhower to talk about his “own
personal feeling on the principle involved” in the school desegregation
controversy, Eisenhower responded,
I have always declined to do that for the simple reason that here was
something that the Supreme Court says, “This is the direction of the
Constitution, this is the instruction of the Constitution”; that is, they say,
“This is the meaning of the Constitution.”
Now, I am sworn to one thing, to defend the Constitution of the United
States, and execute its laws. Therefore, for me to weaken public opinion
by discussion of separate cases, where I might agree or might disagree,
seems to me to be completely unwise and not a good thing to do.
I have an oath; I expect to carry it out. And the mere fact that I could
disagree very violently with a decision, and would so express myself,
then my own duty would be much more difficult to carry out I think. So I
think it is just not good business for me to do so.193

Eisenhower thus found deference to the Court’s supremacy over
constitutional interpretation a way to avoid having to publicly embrace a
ruling with which he held deep misgivings. He found political shelter
beneath the protective umbrella of the Court’s authority.
The Justices arrived at their own commitment to judicial interpretive
supremacy for the opposite reason: they were committed to the rightness of
Brown. Because they were so committed to Brown, they unanimously
signed an opinion that went out of its way to defend an excessive and
unrealistic vision of judicial supremacy.
Yet the Justices spoke from a position of vulnerability as well as
commitment. At a time when the Justices were hesitant to expand Brown
with further guidance on desegregation,194 they chose to write in Cooper a
192. SIMON, supra note 36, at 309 (quoting Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower
to Swede Hazlett (Nov. 18, 1957)); see also id. (quoting Eisenhower’s other expressions of
similar sentiment).
193. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference (Aug. 20, 1958)
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233865). See also President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President on Compliance with Final Orders of the
Courts (Aug. 20, 1958) (transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/
233866) (“Every American must understand that if an individual, community or state is going
successfully and continuously to defy the courts, then there is anarchy.”).
194. See KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 326; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,
162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958).
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resounding defense of judicial supremacy. “Invariably, the Court takes a
bold stand because it fears that the political order will ignore its command,”
write Neal Devins and Louis Fisher.195 The Court makes its most “sweeping
declarations of power” to “cloak institutional self-doubts, much as a gorilla
pounds his chest and makes threatening noises to avoid a fight.”196 Cooper
was written from a defensive, vulnerable posture.197 The Court was lashing
back at its critics. Apprehensive about the institution’s vulnerabilities, the
Justices drew on their most powerful resource, the judicial proclamation,
expressed with the authority of a written opinion by the highest court in the
land, and deployed its hyperbolic assertion of its own supremacy.
C. Public Acceptance of Judicial Supremacy
A final reason Cooper remains such a powerful monument in our
constitutional landscape is that despite its bluster and its unrealistic portrayal
of the Court’s interpretive authority, the American people often act as if they
want the Court to serve this role. Indeed, the strongest arguments in defense
of judicial supremacy fall back not on the merits of the supremacist position
itself, but on the fact that the public has largely accepted the Court in this
role.198 The power of judicial review, Chief Justice Edward Douglas White
195. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L.
REV. 83, 93–94 (1998).
196. Id.; see also MCCLOSKEY, supra note 170, at 276 (Sanford Levinson writing that the
Court’s claims “to theoretical ultimacy and, just as significantly, to the popular acceptance of
its supremacy, have the overtone of the scared whistler going past the graveyard: ultimately
more pathetic than inspiring”).
197. See L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review: Reflections on the
Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 712 (2003)
(describing Cooper as the “boasting of the weak”).
As discussed above, Justice Brennan’s initial draft in Cooper included a more explicit
discussion of the Court’s weak position. This was removed at the urging of other justices. See
supra, Part IV; see also Hutchinson, supra note 110, at 79; SCHWARTZ, supra note 133, at
295.
198. See, e.g., Driver, supra note 100, at 1060 (“Rather than unilaterally taking something
away from ‘the people’ in Cooper, it may be more accurate to understand that decision’s
embrace of judicial supremacy as articulating the notion of constitutional interpretation that
many citizens desired.”); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 405, 411 (2003) (“[T]o the extent critics of judicial supremacy claim to be
speaking for a people whose role has been diminished by an arrogant judiciary, we ought at
least pause to wonder why the people and their formal political organs seem so
unconcerned.”) (emphasis omitted); Suzanna Sherry, Treading on the Supreme Court [letter
to the editor], WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1982, at A12 (“[T]he Marbury-Cooper proposition—that
the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution—has not been seriously
questioned since 1958.”). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN
THE SUPREME COURT (2018) (discussing, inter alia, judicial legitimacy and public
acquiescence).
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once said, rests “solely upon the approval of a free people.”199 This point can
also be applied to the claims of judicial interpretive supremacy. Although
the American people often disagree with particular rulings of the Supreme
Court, they have generally accepted that the Court should be recognized as
the supreme interpreter of the Constitution.200
VII. CONCLUSION
This is where the idea of judicial supremacy over constitutional
interpretation stands today. It is a claim about the Supreme Court and the
Constitution that goes against logic, against history, against basic
democratic principles. But it is also a claim about the Court that is broadly
accepted as a truism of American constitutionalism—a description of the
way it is and the way it ought to be.
Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court’s seminal declaration of its own
interpretive supremacy, is, at its core, as right and true as any decision the
Court has handed down. The Court squarely and powerfully stood up for the
right cause, and it squarely and powerfully pushed aside the claims of those
199. Edward Douglas White, The Supreme Court of the United States, 7 A.B.A. J. 341,
341 (1921); see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (offering what
amounts to an extended historical defense of this point).
200. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 4 (2015)
(observing that “newspapers and constitutional law texts typically treat Court interpretations
of the Constitution as supreme”); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1637–39 (2005); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword:
We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6–7 (2001) (“[I]n the years since Cooper v. Aaron, the
idea of judicial supremacy—the notion that judges have the last word when it comes to
constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of the
Constitution for everyone—has finally found widespread approbation. . . . It seems fair to say
that, as a descriptive matter, judges, lawyers, politicians, and the general public today accept
the principle of judicial supremacy—indeed, they assume it as a matter of course.”).
Edwin Corwin attributed the strength of judicial interpretive supremacy to “professional bias”
among lawyers. EDWIN S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 74 (1938). “Brought up on the
principle of stare decisis, taught to search for the law in the past decisions of the Court, the
bar has naturally been prone to identify the judicial version of the Constitution as the
authentic Constitution.” Id. Corwin quoted a striking articulation of judicial supremacist
thinking by Senator M.M. Logan of Kentucky in 1933. The Supreme Court “is solely vested
with the authority to tell us what the Constitution means,” the senator explained.
It may be that we could say that we disagree with its opinion, but however much
we may disagree with the opinion of the Supreme Court, that opinion is right. It
may not have been right five minutes before the opinion was delivered; it may not
have been right during the entire history of the Nation up to that time; but the very
moment that that opinion is handed down and goes into the law books, when it
becomes final, then the Constitution means and must mean exactly what the
Supreme Court says its means.
Id. at 75 (quoting 77 CONG. REC. 1257 (1933)).
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who stood in the way. It is a heroic decision. But like any real-life hero, it is
a flawed hero.

